Western Cape Conditions Of Service Collective Agreement
 The Claimant submitted that the CCMA`s award, upheld by the Labour Courts, was vitiated by an error of substantive law that misinterpreted sections 28, 35, 36, 37 and 43 of the LRA in conjunction with the definition of “public service” in section 213 of the LRA and the applicable provisions of the PPE.  There was sufficient evidence before the CCMA to support its conclusion that the respondents were complying with the requirements of the agreement. This was done not only to the extent that the agreement itself provided for employment in the public sector, but also to the extent that the defendants fell within the registered jurisdiction of the Negotiating Council.  The Applicant argued that this issue raised both a constitutional issue and a contentious legal issue of general public importance. With regard to the former, it argued that the LRA regulates the fundamental rights conferred by article 23 of the Constitution and confers practical effects on them. It thus provides a framework within which workers, employers and their respective representatives can, inter alia, conduct collective bargaining to define working and employment conditions and other matters of mutual interest. To support her assertion, she also relied on the Court`s decision in nehawu in which Ngcobo J stated: Summary: Labour Relations Act 1995 66 of 1995 – Civil Service Act 103 of 1994 – Definition of the Public Service – Public Health and Social Development Board for Sectoral Bargaining – Aid for Terrifying Skills Collective agreements and individual agreements must follow the law.  In order to prove the error in the applicant`s case, it is necessary to take into account the chronology of the dispute between the parties, which shows that at no time was it disputed between the parties that the respondents held positions within the permanent establishment of the department or the public service.  The allegation that it was up to the respondents to raise this point is also untenable. In my view, if the Department had taken the opposite view, it should have explicitly challenged this issue.
It was for the applicant to provide specific evidence in support of her application, which she had not done.  Finally, the Claimant submitted that the Labour Appeal Court improperly approved the CCMA`s arbitration decision, where the Commissioner found that the respondents did not assert that they held positions in the permanent establishment and therefore did not provide any evidence to justify the balancing. The applicant also argued that the Labour Court of Appeal had disregarded several sections of the LRA and a number of other important acts, resulting in unfair results towards the applicant, since it had imposed liability on the Ministry in the absence of that legal responsibility. We were asked to accept that, had the respondents asserted this secondment, the Applicant would have addressed this issue at this stage. It was pointed out that the interviewees were appointed by the universities and were subject to the terms of service of their respective universities.  The argument that the respondents are not covered by the provisions of the LRA because they did not grow up among the unions that signed the contested agreement is flawed. . . .